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Abstract—In their continuous growth and penetration into
new markets, Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) have
recently made their way into hardware acceleration of machine
learning among other specialized compute-intensive services in
cloud data centers, such as Amazon and Microsoft. To further
maximize their utilization in the cloud, several academic works
propose the spatial multi-tenant deployment model, where the
FPGA fabric is simultaneously shared among mutually mistrust-
ing clients. This is enabled by leveraging the partial reconfig-
uration property of FPGAs, which allows to split the FPGA
fabric into several logically isolated regions and reconfigure the
functionality of each region independently at runtime.
In this paper, we survey industrial and academic deployment
models of multi-tenant FPGAs in the cloud computing settings,
and highlight their different adversary models and security
guarantees, while shedding light on their fundamental shortcom-
ings from a security standpoint. We further survey and classify
existing academic works that demonstrate a new class of remotely-
exploitable physical attacks on multi-tenant FPGA devices, where
these attacks are launched remotely by malicious clients sharing
physical resources with victim users. Through investigating the
problem of end-to-end multi-tenant FPGA deployment more
comprehensively, we reveal how these attacks actually represent
only one dimension of the problem, while various open security
and privacy challenges remain unaddressed. We conclude with
our insights and a call for future research to tackle these
challenges.
Index Terms—Cloud FPGA Security, Multi-tenancy, FPGA-
based Acceleration, Cloud Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are integrated
circuits that can be (re)programmed after fabrication to
implement custom functionalities in hardware, as opposed
to application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs). FPGAs,
with their more flexible computing fabric than their ASIC
counterparts, higher throughput and computing power than
their software counterparts, low energy consumption, and
continuously increasing capacities, have been perceived to
bring the best of both hardware and software worlds. In their
steady growth and penetration of different application domains,
FPGAs have also made their way into hardware acceleration of
machine learning applications among other compute-intensive
services. More recently, they have been increasingly adopted
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in data centers to accelerate cloud-based services, such as by
Microsoft [1], [2]. Other enterprises, such as Amazon [3] are
even offering clients to rent FPGAs in the cloud which they
can freely configure with their own logic.
Multi-tenant FPGAs. To maximize FPGA utilization and
the pertinent return-on-investment in cloud computing, it
has been proposed to share a single FPGA fabric among
the users [4]–[10] by leveraging the partial reconfiguration
property of FPGAs. This key distinguishing feature of FPGAs
allows to reconfigure the functionality of a part, or region of
the FPGA while being deployed in-field (at runtime). Both
reconfigurations, normal and partial, of FPGAs have led to the
development of the notion of virtualized or multi-tenant FPGAs,
which are used interchangeably to refer to FPGAs shared among
several users in the cloud. While this distinction is often never
clearly outlined, FPGA sharing/multiplexing/partitioning can
occur either temporally or spatially. Temporal sharing is where
the FPGA device fabric, or the accelerator configured on, is
used by different users or tenants at different time slots, but
never simultaneously. This is the more conventional FPGA
sharing model and the one deployed now in industry solutions.
More recently, however, researchers in academia and industry
have been investigating spatial sharing, where different tenants’
logic can be simultaneously located on different logically
isolated regions of a single FPGA device. While principally
possible and would further boost utilization, such a setting is
not currently deployed in cloud computing architectures, and
raises a plethora of new security and privacy concerns, which
have not been comprehensively and systematically investigated.
Remotely-Exploitable Physical Attacks. However, recent
academic works have investigated one dimension of this prob-
lem, where they have demonstrated how remotely-exploitable
physical attacks are possible in such multi-tenant settings,
with a particular focus on spatial multi-tenancy. Such attacks
have been shown to compromise the availability (e.g., DoS
attacks) [11], [12], confidentiality (e.g., side- or covert-channel
attacks) [13]–[19] or integrity (e.g., fault injection attacks) [20]
of the victim client’s logic on the FPGA. The key enabler
for most of these attacks is the fact that both the victim
and malicious clients have: 1) their logic, while logically
isolated, still co-located on hardware fabric that shares the
supply voltage and are thus not physically isolated, 2) and
have the complete freedom to configure their allocated regions
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with any (malicious) hardware logic of their choice.
End-to-End Multi-tenant FPGA Deployment. We ob-
serve, however, that most of these works are concentrated
on only one dimension of the significantly more complex and
multi-dimensional problem of end-to-end deployment of multi-
tenant FPGAs in the cloud. Remotely-exploitable physical
attacks, while clearly a threat, are indeed not the primary
security/privacy challenge stemming from these deployment
settings. Other more fundamental questions remain unaddressed:
How is clients’ Intellectual Property (IP) protection assured?
How can clients communicate their FPGA configuration files,
a.k.a., bitstreams securely and privately to the device? How is
secret key management on multi-tenant FPGAs possible without
relying on a trusted third-party? Can current FPGA devices,
which are designed to accommodate secret keys of single end-
users, suffice the requirements of multi-tenant FPGAs?
What further aggravates the problem is how these challenges
and trust provisions and assumptions change for different
usage and setting scenarios. Moreover, emerging FPGA-based
computing trends such as data center disaggregation into
resource pools [21], disaggregation to the edge and FPGA-
based confidential computing [22], among others, further bring
rise to new and different challenges. We consider that such
open and fundamental challenges stand in the way of secure
deployment of multi-tenant FPGAs in the cloud.
Contributions. Through this work, we aim to:
• Introduce the state of the art in current and emerging
trends in multi-tenant FPGA cloud computing.
• Survey the state-of-the-art in remotely-exploitable physical
attacks in multi-tenant FPGA settings and highlight how
this class of attacks represents only one dimension of the
many open security and privacy challenges of end-to-end
multi-tenant FPGA cloud computing.
• Present a comprehensive list of the different security
challenges and potential approaches to address them.
• Discuss why spatial multi-tenant FPGA computing is not
encouraged without certain mitigation measures in place,
and conclude with a call to action for future research
in addressing the challenges of end-to-end multi-tenant
FPGA deployment.
II. BACKGROUND: FIELD PROGRAMMABLE GATE ARRAYS
FPGAs are integrated circuits that can be electrically
programmed or configured by end users to implement different
digital circuits. Compared to Application Specific Integrated
Circuits (ASICs), FPGAs are cost-effective and have shorter
time-to-market. Moreover, unlike ASICs, FPGAs can be
reconfigured to overwrite or update an existing design. However,
the flexible nature of FPGAs comes at additional costs in terms
of area, power consumption and performance, which are mainly
attributed to the programmable interconnect of FPGAs [23].
FPGAs consist of three major components: configurable logic
elements, configurable interconnects and input/output (I/O)
blocks, which provide off-chip connections. Configurable logic
blocks are connected together and to I/O blocks through
the configurable routing interconnects to form the desired
functionality. Other components of FPGAs are memory blocks
(BRAM) and digital signal processing blocks (DSPs) for high-
performance DSP applications, as shown in Fig. 1b [23].
FPGA integration levels continue to increase with recent
devices leveraging advances in 3D integration and packaging
to integrate multiple dies in a single device, e.g., Intel Stratix
10 and Xilinx Virtex UltraScale+. FPGAs are usually provided
to end users on printed circuit boards (PCBs) Fig. 1a, such that
a single board can have one or more FPGA chips. A single
chip can pack one or multiple dies, by leveraging advances
in 3D integration and packaging, as in recent FPGA chips,
e.g., Intel Stratix 10 and Xilinx Virtex UltraScale+. We show
this distinction, since academic proposals called for leveraging
the different chips per PCB or different dies per chip in the
multi-tenant FPGAs in the cloud.
Design flow refers to the steps required to transform an
abstract circuit description, written in hardware description
language (HDL), such as Verilog or VHDL, into a functioning
circuit on a target FPGA. In synthesis, an abstract form of
circuit description (functional, behavioral or structural) is trans-
lated into a functionally-equivalent gate-level representation,
netlist, using a suite of different optimizations and mapping
algorithms. Next, in place-and-route, the generated netlist is
mapped onto the target FPGA’s resources, i.e., LUTs, FFs,
BRAMs, DSP cores, etc. In this step, the routing resources to
connect the allocated resources are defined while preserving
timing constraints, e.g., operating frequency. The developer
can influence the outcome of this step by adding placement
constraints as well. For example, the developer can restrict the
design to be allocated on a specific region in the FPGA, or
can force the routing of connections through specific channels.
In bitstream generation, the actual binary file that configures
the target FPGA is generated.
Partial Reconfiguration (PR) enables dynamically recon-
figuring a portion of the FPGA, while the rest of the FPGA
logic continues to operate seamlessly [24]. An FPGA can be
partitioned into a static region and one or more reconfigurable
regions (RRs), such that a reconfigurable region can be
configured with its own partial bitstream without affecting other
regions. This has been one of the most significant features of
FPGAs in cloud-centric applications, since it allows the cloud
service provider (CSP) to partition the FPGA into one or more
RRs executing different functions, thus enabling the CSP to
push in new features or updates with increased flexibility and
ease. Fig. 1a shows an FPGA configuration with different
RRs that can communicate with host CPU or other peripherals
via pre-defined interfaces implemented in the static region. As
long as the PR bitstream is accommodated by the resources of
the allocated RR, the rest of the FPGA does not get affected
by the dynamic reconfiguration of that region logic.
III. FPGA DEPLOYMENT IN THE CLOUD
Early FPGAs deployments were primarily for applications
such as telecommunications and ASIC prototyping. More
recently, they are finding their way into large-scale data centers
and cloud computing services for accelerating a wide range
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(a) Printed Circuit Board (PCB), Chips & Dies with Reconfigurable Regions (RRs).
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Fig. 1. FPGAs on Board.
of compute-intensive workloads such as machine learning,
genomic data processing and other scientific computations [5],
[6], [25], [26]. Confidential computing, another emerging trend,
deploys FPGAs in the cloud to provide FPGA-based enclaves,
where clients, a.k.a. tenants can securely run (part of their)
applications on sensitive data [22], [27]. These very different
deployment settings, however, call for different requirements
from the FPGA device itself as well as effective abstraction,
virtualization and resource management techniques, which we
briefly overview next.
A. State-of-the-Art Academic Deployment Models
In order to maximize resource utilization and return-on-
investment of FPGA resources deployed in the cloud, sharing
these devices among different tenants is required, which is
possible due to the reconfigurable nature of FPGAs (see § II).
To further enable this sharing, virtualization is required where
the interface of interaction with the FPGAs is simplified,
while abstracting away the complexities and intricacies of the
underlying devices. Earlier FPGA virtualization was primarily
concerned with temporal FPGA multiplexing [28] to swap in
and out partitions of larger designs when device capacity was
limited. Over the years, the definition of FPGA virtualization
has evolved significantly (in line with evolving FPGA capacity
and capability), and is now almost aligned with that of typical
CPU and I/O virtualization [29], as shown in Fig. 2. Certain
features about FPGAs, however, render their virtualization
different from typical CPU and I/O virtualization and pose
specific challenges, namely their heterogeneity, execution model
and their platform/vendor-dependent configuration.
Virtualization Models. Nevertheless, there has been sig-
nificant progress and development in FPGA virtualization in
recent years [5], [7], [30], with FPGAs now deployed in the
cloud to provide either Acceleration-as-a-Service (AaaS) or
FPGA-as-a-Service (FaaS). The AaaS model provides tenants
with FPGA-accelerated services, where the FPGA is deployed
to accelerate a specific pre-defined functionality, such as
a machine learning computation. The tenant cannot freely
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Fig. 2. FPGA virtualization in typical cloud computing deployment.
configure the FPGA hardware fabric as desired, but can only
leverage its computational benefit in an acceleration service pre-
defined by the cloud service provider (CSP) and the enterprise
hosting the service on the cloud. On the other hand, the FaaS
model enables a more flexible usage where dedicated FPGAs
are allocated to tenants and freely configured by them as desired,
i.e., with compatible bitstreams of their own logic. Most of
the state-of-the-art work in academia is focused on boosting
performance for the FaaS cloud-based model [4]–[10]. More
details on AaaS and FaaS are in § III-B.
Nevertheless, both cloud-based models require some mech-
anism of virtualization, similar to that in Fig. 2 to abstract
hardware-specific details and represent the FPGA device and
its components as yet another resource pool that can be
actively managed, queried, allocated and de-allocated by tenants
through the OS deployed in a cloud infrastructure. The cloud
OS scheduler handles requests from tenants, creates virtual
machines (VMs) for them, and schedules their tasks and
resource requirements across a number of available resources
and compute nodes, e.g., CPUs, memory, disks, as well as
FPGAs. The tenants are thus provided access to their required
resources via these VMs.
Virtualization Granularity. The next question of FPGA
virtualization concerns the level of granularity of FPGA
primitives that would get abstracted into a resource pool
available for tenants to consume. Abstracting FPGAs into
registers, LUTs, I/O blocks, and memory blocks for tenants to
request is, however, not trivial. This is because current FPGA-
based development remains largely dependent on the specific
hardware fabric of the FPGA and its layout details (see § II).
These details must be visible to the FPGA toolchain in order
to generate a compatible FPGA bitstream, since hardware-
agnostic FPGA bitstream generation by means of overlays
remains an open research problem [31], [32]. Moreover, the
irregular distribution of these primitives across the FPGA fabric
imposes spatial constraints on how the device gets partitioned
into reconfigurable regions (RRs) and how client’s logic gets
mapped into one of these regions. Recent FPGAs have made
strides in the direction of regularity [33].
Thus, FPGA virtualization schemes usually propose pro-
viding a pool of different accelerator functions from which
tenants can select. When an accelerator function is selected,
its respective pre-compiled bitstream is used to configure one
of the available fixed-size reconfigurable regions (RRs) of the
FPGA [5], [6], e.g. any of regions A - D in Fig. 2. These
regions are each considered a “virtual FPGA (vFPGA)” where
any accelerator can be configured on it, so long as the region
provides the required resources, thus providing some degree
of independence from the FPGA fabric spatial specifics [6]. A
tenant can either use an API to call an accelerator, or explicitly
select a specific bitstream, or even be allowed to provide his/her
own FPGA logic that gets compiled into a compatible bitstream
(in case of FaaS). Furthermore, to enable more flexibility with
respect to the sizing of these RRs or vFPGAs, recent work by
Khawaja et al. [10] has introduced a new layer of abstraction
that encapsulates user FPGA logic and enables its mapping to
dynamically sized FPGA physical zones. Besides RRs, some
logic on the FPGA device must remain statically configured (as
shown in Fig. 2), referred to as the FPGA shell or hypervisor
logic [6]. This logic provides the physical infrastructure and
logic that controls the remaining FPGA fabric (RRs A - D)
and their connections to the FPGA interfaces.
Virtualization Stack. To share the available FPGAs and
the RRs therein across multiple tenants, the hypervisor layer
is required to provide host drivers to enable accessibility for
the tenants to the underlying FPGAs. A controller module
is also required to manage the resources allocation, perform
address translation and provide bottom-level software interfaces
to the FPGAs, thus providing multiple virtual instances of
the FPGA devices [6]. Libraries are required to wrap up
the available services (different FPGA configurations) into
accelerator functions and maintain their bitstreams, while also
providing respective APIs for tenants to call and use the
accelerators from their software applications. The FPGA device
node is either configured as a stand-alone compute node and
is accessed directly and independently over Ethernet [5], [34],
or tied to another compute node through which it can only be
accessed, e.g., the host CPU through PCI Express [6].
FPGA (Temporal and Spatial) Multi-Tenancy. This virtu-
alized deployment thus enables FPGA multi-tenancy, which in
its conventional definition, refers to temporal sharing of FPGA
devices. Temporal sharing is where the FPGA device itself,
or the accelerator functionality configured on it, is used by
different users or tenants at different time slots (in some form
of time multiplexing), but never simultaneously. This FPGA
sharing model is currently deployed in industry solutions.
More recently, there has been a growing interest in both
academia and industry to enable spatial multi-tenancy on FPGA
devices, where multiple tenants’ logic are co-located on the
same physical FPGA device simultaneously. In other words, two
mistrusting tenants would have their configuration bitstreams
simultaneously occupying the logically isolated RRs, e.g., A
and B in Fig. 2. While such a deployment model is principally
possible, and would ultimately maximize resource utilization
and performance gain, it raises a multitude of challenges that
have not been systematically investigated before. One of the
key challenges that distinguish this from CPU sharing across
multiple tenants, is the security/privacy issues that arise not
only at the system-level but also at the physical-level, due
to the sharing of the raw hardware fabric/compute substrate
itself, where the mutually mistrusting tenants have complete
privilege and freedom to configure their allocated RRs as
desired. Even if each tenant is restricted to configure the
fabric of its allocated RR, the underlying hardware substrate
and its physical implementation, such as the power supply or
distribution are effectively still shared, thus isolation at this
level is challenging.
Performance vs. Security Gap. From a performance and
efficiency standpoint, there is an abundance of significant
works in the literature [4]–[10], among others, that have been
concentrated on boosting performance and resource utilization
for virtualized or multi-tenant FPGA deployment, i.e., are
performance-centric, as shown above. On the other hand,
from a security and privacy standpoint, the state of multi-
tenant FPGAs lags behind. Very little has been invested in
investigating and enabling more security-centric end-to-end
deployment models that are suited for usage scenarios where
the FPGAs are leveraged to perform security-critical tasks on
sensitive data [22], [27], [35], or the clients are providing their
proprietary designs to be accelerated on cloud FPGA devices
and rightfully do not want to trust the CSP.
Besides academia, we present next an overview of the actual
deployment models adopted by the cloud computing industry
to date in § III-B. In doing so, we aim to provide readers
with a comprehensive overview of the state of the art in both
academia and industry with respect to FPGA virtualization,
while shedding light in § IV on how multiple security and
privacy challenges remain largely unaddressed.
B. Commercial Deployment Solutions and Services
FPGA-accelerated computing has been investigated and
recently deployed by various commercial CSPs, e.g., Microsoft,
Amazon AWS, etc. In the following we briefly look into the
two prominent deployment models of cloud FPGAs.
AaaS. Microsoft Azure was among the first data centers to
introduce FPGAs in cloud computing by augmenting CPUs
with an interconnected and configurable compute layer of
FPGAs to accelerate portions of large-scale software services,
e.g., Bing web search [36] and host networking [37]. Microsoft
demonstrated the first proof of concept that deployed FPGAs
to accelerate web search on its Bing web search engine [1]. For
those original Azure deployments, Microsoft uses Intel Stratix
V and Arria 10 FPGAs. Recently, Microsoft has announced its
Project Brainwave [2], a deep learning acceleration platform
using Intel Stratix 10 FPGAs, aiming to deliver “real-time AI”.
The project aims to support the AI capabilities in Microsoft
services like Bing web search and Skype language translations.
FaaS. Several CSPs offer their clients FPGA-accelerated
computing instances to speed up their applications based on
their needs. Prominent examples are Amazon EC2 F1 [3],
Huawei FACS FP1 [38], Alibaba F1 & F3 [39], Baidu FPGA
Cloud Server [40], and Telekom ECS [41]. The differences
among them are mainly in the allocated resources (RAM,
vCPUs, network, etc.) and the available FPGA devices a client
can rent. Depending on the selected instance capacity, multiple
FPGA devices can be configured together to enable larger
applications distributed efficiently across the FPGAs. Further-
more, the allotted FPGA devices are dedicated exclusively
for the user during the paid duration, i.e., spatial multi-tenant
FPGA usage is not yet provided, as far as we can infer from
the publicly available service description. These instances
enable clients to develop FPGA-based services and accelerators
by providing a VM with pre-installed and licensed FPGA
design tools, i.e., Intel Quartus, Xilinx Vivado or SDAccel
depending on the FPGA vendor, as well as hardware and
software development kits. Ultimately, this enables both expert
hardware developers and high-level language clients to benefit
from these tailored instances depending on how they leverage
the provided development flow. Clients can develop their own
FPGA-accelerated tasks for personal usage or for commercial
purposes as in Amazon AWS or Huawei, where clients can
offer their accelerators in the corresponding marketplace. After
the hardware development process is complete and a particular
FPGA image is generated, users can then proceed with the
software development process, i.e., to develop, debug and
run the user applications that will benefit from the FPGA-
accelerated tasks.
However, one primary concern among the aforementioned
solutions is IP protection for clients who run their IP, e.g.,
trained machine learning models on private data, on the
available FPGA resources in the cloud, among many others. In
light of the presented FPGA-based cloud computing solutions
in both academia and industry, we outline next a more
comprehensive end-to-end analysis of the different privacy
and security challenges that arise.
IV. SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONCERNS
In such multi-layered cloud FPGA deployment settings,
that are emerging in different flavors and intricacies, many
fundamental security and privacy challenges arise. Particularly,
for temporal and spatial FPGA multi-tenancy, new specific
challenges arise that, to date, remain open and unaddressed.
A. Stakeholders
We enlist here the various stakeholders in FPGA cloud
computing deployment in more detail. We also discuss how
their different security/privacy concerns and obligations and the
relationships among them both impose and influence different
challenges and trust assumptions in an inevitable interplay, as
abstracted in Fig. 3.
FPGA-based cloud services are commonly deployed by
a CSP, which provides different usage models and services
that involve heterogeneous architectures as discussed in § III.
This usually involves a standard CPU-based host interfacing
with co-processors and accelerator devices, such as GPUs
and FPGAs, and offloading particular computation tasks to
them as shown in Fig. 3. Thus, users/clients, a.k.a. tenants
would purchase or rent the desired computation capacity and
facilities and communicate their workload (which may include
private/confidential data as well as intellectual property (IP)
designs) to the CSP. The CSP, being the platform owner,
may offload the workload from more mutually distrusting
tenants to an accelerator device simultaneously, to maximize
resource utilization and return on their investment, while
reaping even higher performance gains. These FPGA devices
and their development environments/toolchains are provided
by the FPGA vendor to the CSP, which are, in turn, made
available (besides additional toolchains also provisioned by the
CSP) for the tenants to use over the CSP provided service.
Besides tenants’ IP, the CSP itself may be providing IP, as
well as the FPGA vendor and other IP partners or enterprises,
which are developing their own third-party IP and releasing
them in an IP marketplace (hosted by the CSP) for tenants
to purchase and use, e.g., Amazon AWS SaaS. This could
be proprietary algorithms.To establish secure communication
channels between the users and the CSP, a trusted authority
(TA) is required for the management and provisioning of digital
certificates, which could either be yet another dedicated party
or the CSP itself. Moreover, if FPGA bitstream encryption
(for preserving IP confidentiality) is supported, then either
the FPGA vendor or the TA would have to assume the
responsibilities of secure key provisioning for both the FPGA
device and the tenants and digital certificates management.
Further amplifying the complexity of these relationships, a
very recent trend for maximizing data center efficiency and
flexibility also involves the CSP disaggregating its facilities
across multiple different distributed resource pools [21], and
thus migrating the computation to these resource pools.
Other stakeholders are also involved, which we purposefully
keep out of scope to render this more approachable and
practical. Examples include foundry facilities that hardware
vendors rely on for fabricating their devices, as well as
independent entities that issue certificates for CSPs’ compliance
with security and privacy standards. We assume, however, that
trusting these entities, especially fabrication facilities (for the
CPUs and FPGA devices acquired by the CSP) is a reasonable
and fundamental assumption one has to make. Moreover, such
threats and their proposed mitigation mechanisms occur at
a very different layer of abstraction, and are an active and
orthogonal research focus [42].
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Fig. 3. Stakeholders and their security/privacy concerns in FPGA-based
cloud computing.
B. Threat Landscape
With these stakeholders and multiple mutually distrusting
tenants simultaneously sharing FPGA resources (either tem-
porally or spatially) in mind, we identify a list of different
(non-exhaustive) security and privacy concerns. These can be
classified into either access control, IP/data protection or
physical-level threats, and are as follows:
• Tenant data must be protected against malicious network
adversaries when it is sent to the CSP Ê.
• Tenant data must be protected against potentially compro-
mised system software Ë.
• Tenant data must be protected against potentially compro-
mised co-tenants’ workload Ì.
• Tenant data, which may be offloaded to the accelerator
device (FPGA), must be protected when transmitted
to/from the FPGA Í. This largely depends on, and may
also influence, the choice of communication link between
the host and the FPGA, e.g., physical link such as PCI
Express, Ethernet or a wireless link. Possible attacks
include man-in-the-middle attacks, payload misdirection,
and device/communication spoofing or sniffing. This also
includes protecting both the confidentiality and integrity of
FPGA bitstreams (clients’ own and enterprises’ proprietary
IP) before and after FPGA configuration.
• Tenant data must be protected from untrusted and poten-
tially malicious or compromised tenants executing on the
FPGA device. Damage, which can be caused by malicious
logic executing on the FPGA, does not only affect co-
tenants but also the cloud infrastructure (see § VI) Î.
• In the case of disaggregation (both vertical and horizontal)
to distributed resources, tenant data must be protected in
transit. This again includes all network attacks Ï.
• Given the distributed nature of such resources, tenant data
must also be protected at rest and in processing. This
is especially a concern with disaggregation to the edge
since physical access attacks are a more likely a threat,
as opposed to a single, centralized and physically secure
data center Ð.
• The CSP (and consequently the tenants) must be able to
trust (or be provided with the relevant assurances/proof of
trust) the FPGA devices provided by the FPGA vendor,
their fabric, the security of the interfaces (particularly the
debug interfaces) integrated, the cryptographic primitives
baked in (which constitute part of the root of trust), and
all provisioned toolchains Ñ.
• Enterprises hosting their own solutions and IP using
CSP services must be protected from malicious access,
counterfeiting, tampering and be able to manage, query
and monitor their IP licensing rights and usage Ò.
Several of these security threats, aside from ones that arise
specifically from FPGA use, have their analogues in traditional
cloud-based VM computing. Moreover, based on the cloud
infrastructure, deployment settings, and assumed adversarial
model for a given usage scenario, some of them may not
even apply, and others may not require explicit catering and
assurances, if certain reasonable trust assumptions are instead
made. For example in performance-centric settings, if the
tenants are willing to trust the CSP with their own data and
IP, security concern Ë is no longer valid. In security-centric
settings where the tenant does not trust the CSP with its
security-sensitive data or its IP and demands more guarantees,
all the above listed security concerns would hold and a CSP
would be required to provide assurances to mitigate them.
Examples include deploying a Trusted Execution Environment
(TEE), e.g. Intel SGX’s [43] or AMD’s SEV [44], to achieve
isolation of tenants and OS, thus mitigating concerns Ë and Ì.
Along the same line of trusting these hardware vendors for the
TEE architecture, the CSP would assume trust in the FPGA
vendor, the provisioned FPGA devices and toolchains, thus
directly addressing concerns Ñ. This would still, however, fail
to provide security assurances to mitigate concerns Í and Î,
which would require other mitigation mechanisms in place.
Notably, from a CSP’s standpoint, it may actual be favorable to
assume a security-centric model and the tenant’s mistrust, and
thus, be required to provide the relevant security guarantees
for the tenants. Ultimately, this would limit their liability
with respect to the clients’ data and IP, and would attract
more customers, generating more business and profitability.
With these concerns in mind, we examine next the security
mechanisms currently provided by FPGA vendors in their
devices.
While the security challenges of end-to-end multi-tenant
FPGA deployment raised above have received very little
dedicated attention in academia, a number of works have
addressed some dimensions of the problem. However, none
focus exclusively on all the specific challenges and needs that
arise due to cloud-based FPGA deployment and FPGA sharing
among multiple tenants in that setting. In what follows next,
we present an overview of the state of the art in academia
with respect to system-level attacks and defenses that are
concentrated on IP protection and access control issues
in § V, followed by a more detailed survey of recently reported
remotely-exploitable physical-level attacks in § VI and their
defenses in § VII.
V. SYSTEM-LEVEL ATTACKS AND DEFENSES
We present next an overview of the state-of-the-art IP protec-
tion capabilities of recent FPGA devices for cloud deployment,
followed by academic solutions proposed specifically for the
cloud settings.
A. IP Protection
FPGA Vendors Support. We briefly outline next the
protection mechanisms provided by prominent FPGA vendors
for IP protection, in terms of confidentiality and integrity.
Intel Arria 10 and Stratix 10 families incorporate built-in
AES-GCM-256 and elliptic curve cryptography ECC-256/384
for bitstream decryption and authentication, respectively. The
secret key can be provisioned either in a volatile memory
powered with a coin-cell battery or in a one-time programmable
non-volatile memory [45], where both can be programmed
through JTAG. Moreover, Intel Stratix 10 FPGAs and beyond
provide an irreversible tampering-protection mode to enforce
bitstream encryption, where JTAG, test modes as well as FPGA
configuration readback 1 are disabled, thus preventing readback
of unencrypted configuration data [45], [46]. These services are
all provided by the secure device manager (SDM), a TPM-like
micro-processor, which also enables secure in-field encryption
key upgrades (for single sessions) for Intel Stratix 10 FPGAs,
besides permanently updating the SDM locally with a new
key [46], [47].
Xilinx provides in UltraScale and UltraScale+ families built-
in AES-GCM-256 and RSA-2048 for bitstream decryption
and authentication, respectively. Encryption key is stored
internally in either dedicated RAM, backed up by a small
externally connected battery, or in a non-volatile (eFUSE)
register, both of which can be locked to prevent read/write
accesses. The encryption key can be programmed into the
device through an external JTAG interface or an internal JTAG
primitive, which can be further used to perform remote updates
of the BBRAM key in-field [48]. When using RSA-2048
authentication, the hash of the public key must be programmed
1This enables reading configuration memory content (LUTs and pro-
grammable connections) to support the implementation of error correction for
reliability issues.
into an eFUSE register. When bitstream encryption is enabled,
external readback of configuration memory is automatically
disabled [49]. To protect the encryption key, Xilinx obfuscates
the secret key on UltraScale and UltraScale+ families using
a metalized family key stored in the silicon, since the same
key is used for all devices of the same family. Xilinx does not
provide the family key as part of its toolchain, however, only
distributes it to ‘qualified’ customers [49].
Both Intel and Xilinx FPGAs use volatile SRAM for
configuration memory. Since this loses its content at power-off,
an off-chip non-volatile memory is used to store the bitstream
until it is loaded to the FPGA again at the next power-up.
Therefore, it is necessary to provision the bitstream securely
between power cycles.
Microsemi provides Intrinsic-ID SRAM-PUFs in SmartFu-
sion 2 and IGLOO 2 FPGAs, in addition to several built-in
cryptographic cores (SHA-256, AES-256, ECC, etc.). These
built-in crypto cores are not exclusive for bitstream protection;
they can be used by the users in their designs as well. Moreover,
SRAM-PUFs can be used to derive FPGA-specific public and
private keys for ECC, where the public key is provided to
the user and can be used for ECC encryption. Microsemi
FPGAs have two operating modes: user mode, in which the
configuration, i.e., the user’s design, cannot be read out, and
factory test mode, used by Microsemi during the manufacturing
process and disabled when shipped to the user. In this mode,
the configuration memory, and thus the user’s design, can be
read out using the proper test programs. However, factory
test mode can be re-enabled by the user by matching factory
passcodes to perform failure analysis [50].
IP Protection in Cloud FPGAs. In [22], the authors propose
to leverage IP protection to create a TEE on the FPGA and
protect client data and computations in the cloud from an
untrusted CSP. A trusted authority (TA) is introduced for
provisioning of a secret key to each FPGA securely locally
before deployment in the cloud. Clients send their IP to the TA
(targeting a specific FPGA instance) for encryption. The client
then sends the encrypted bitstream to the FPGA instance for
configuration. Alternatively, public key encryption generated
by the TA is proposed, such that the client can encrypt the
bitstream using the public key of a given FPGA instance and
configure it directly without involving the TA. While this work
indirectly addresses the problem of key provisioning on FPGAs
in the cloud by introducing a trusted third party, it merely
transfers the trust problem with respect to key provisioning
from one party (the CSP) to a third party (the TA).
In summary, IP protection in cloud FPGAs requires vendor
post-deployment support to provision and manage FPGA-
specific secret keys, thus assuring clients that they are actually
communicating with the intended FPGAs. Nevertheless, the
major concern with proposed solutions to date is that the
CSP has no guarantees that the encrypted bitstream is free of
malicious circuits (see § VI-A).
B. Access Control
Yazdanshenas et al. [51], [52] attempt to address data
confidentiality for communication among different mutually
mistrusting regions on one FPGA and for off-chip communi-
cation. They claim that floor-planning regions on the FPGA
as physically far as possible would improve physical isolation
and prevent crosstalk attacks (see § VI). While this would
be true for crosstalk, it does not mitigate power leakage
attacks, and further requires knowledge of the FPGA layout and
adjacent wiring. To mitigate communication and data-sniffing
attacks they propose to use encryption in the FPGA static
configuration logic for all incoming/outgoing FPGA traffic
through its interfaces. They also propose to add encryption
core wrappers around regions to further encrypt inter-region
communication to mitigate more sophisticated attacks where
routing multiplexers can be configured by the tenant of one
region to tap into the wires of another for example. However,
extensive support by the FPGA vendor is required to integrate
these architectural modifications into their FPGAs. The authors
also propose to leverage the hardwired Network-on-Chip (NoC)
that is incorporated in the recently introduced Xilinx Versal
FPGAs [53] where the NoC can be used to connect these
regions via encryption-enhanced routers.
The feasibility of other inter-region attacks has been high-
lighted in [54], where one tenant can gain unauthorized access
to another tenant’s IP by launching an address-redirection attack
to load the victim’s bitstream from otherwise unauthorized
memory locations. Alternatively, the malicious tenant can also
steal IP without directly accessing the bitstream by redirecting
messages between the application and the hardware accelerator
task to an unauthorized malicious hardware task to disclose
sensitive data. Another threat is that of task hiding where the
attacker can bypass the reconfiguration manager and reconfigure
the FPGA with a malicious unregistered bitstream that e.g.,
damages the FPGA device (DoS).
To mitigate such attacks, the authors propose to add a secure
authentication module (SAM), that is external to the FPGA
device (off-chip), to manage the communication between FPGA
and the external world, as well as authenticate the hardware
tasks and software applications, and enforce the required
access control (assuming that the reconfiguration manager is
compromised). Upon client registration in the cloud, this SAM
generates a client secret key and shares it securely with the
client. The client integrates the secret key in the software
application and the FPGA bitstream and both are uploaded to
the cloud. When a client SW-application requests an FPGA-
accelerated hardware task, the requested bitstream is fetched
from its storage memory and used to configure a region on the
FPGA. The SAM verifies that both the SW-application and the
FPGA-accelerated task belong to the corresponding legitimate
client using the implanted secret key at the registration step. If
authenticated, the SAM sends both components another secret
key to establish encrypted data exchange between them. Thus,
the established chain of trust relies on the security of assigning
the secret key to the client at registration step. However, if the
bitstream (with the implanted key) is not stored in protected
memory or encrypted at storage, it remains vulnerable to
unauthorized access by other tenants, thus compromising the
security of the entire scheme.
VI. REMOTELY-EXPLOITABLE PHYSICAL ATTACKS
In this section, we present state-of-the-art remotely-
exploitable physical attacks (referred to as remote physical
attacks for brevity) in multi-tenant FPGAs. Some of these
attacks assume spatial multi-tenancy, where the clients are
either spatially co-located on a single FPGA, or even on two
different FPGAs sharing the same power delivery system, while
others work in temporal multi-tenancy model, where clients
share the same FPGA after each other. These attacks can either
target availability (e.g., DoS attacks), confidentiality (e.g., side-
or covert-channel attacks) or integrity (e.g., fault injection
attacks) of the client’s logic on the cloud FPGA. The key
enabler for most of these attacks is that victim and malicious
clients can freely configure their logic on physical fabric that
share the power supply. For a better understanding of the
attacks, we provide a brief description of the power supply
system of FPGAs next, as well as the primitives deployed
in such attacks in § VI-A and § VI-B, before classifying the
attacks in § VI-C, § VI-D and § VI-E.
Power Distribution Network (PDN) for an FPGA consists
of a voltage regulator, decoupling capacitors and a grid of
interconnects, modeled as an RLC-network, to deliver the power
and ground voltages to FPGA components [55], [56]. The
voltage drop Vdrop is modeled as the sum of two components
a steady-state voltage drop IR and a transient voltage drop
Ldi/dt caused by the interconnect resistance and inductance
of the RLC-network, respectively. The power consumption is
a product of voltage drop and drawn current. Since voltage
supplied to the FPGA device must remain fixed at a pre-defined
level, changes in power demands, which vary based on the
running functionality, are manifested as changes in current
demands. The voltage regulator and the decoupling capacitors
operate in parallel to accommodate the changes in current
demand and to compensate steady-state and transient voltage
drops, respectively, to try and maintain a fixed voltage level.
However, in case of sharp transient changes (in picoseconds)
in current demand of the FPGA, neither the voltage regulator
nor the decoupling capacitors can respond fast enough. This
leads to spatial and temporal fluctuations of the voltage level
in the PDN, which may result in functional failures.
A. Reconfigurable Sensors
Newer generations of reconfigurable platforms include
analog built-in sensors to monitor the FPGA’s supply voltage
and temperature, e.g., Xilinx System Monitor (SYSMON).
However, such built-in sensors cannot capture the internal
changes of operating conditions in the FPGA fabric and have a
low sampling frequency, e.g., SYSMON4 has a sampling rate
of 0.2 MHz for the FPGA die on the Virtex UltraScale+ [57].
Therefore, fine-grained on-chip sensors, which can measure
the impact of physical properties (e.g., voltage variations in
power distribution network, aging, etc.) of different regions on
the reconfigurable logic, have been proposed [58], [59]. Two
prominent examples of such on-chip sensors, which are imple-
mented in the FPGA fabric and can perform self-measurement
of their path delays, are the ring oscillator and delay-line based
sensors. Since propagation delay in combinatorial circuits 2
is highly affected by process, voltage and temperature (PVT)
variations, a self-measurement of combinatorial propagation
delays provides a means of measuring fine-grained changes
in operating conditions and process variations. Nevertheless,
calibration or post-processing steps might be required to
suppress the undesired effects [59], [60].
Ring Oscillator (RO) Based Sensor. A classical ring
oscillator (RO) consists of an AND gate (enabler) and an
odd number of serially-chained inverters, where the output
of the last inverter is fed back to the input of the AND gate
(along with an enable signal), thus forming a combinatorial
loop circuit. Such combinatorial loop circuits can be detected
by running design rule check (DRC), embedded in the FPGA
toolchain, on the design netlist 3. However, sequential latch-
based RO and flip-flop based RO designs can bypass DRC
tests [61]. The different RO structures are demonstrated in § -A.
When a RO circuit is enabled, the RO output signal alternates
between ‘1’ and ‘0’ continuously. The switching frequency at
the RO output, i.e., the RO frequency, is inversely proportional
to the delay of a signal traversing the feedback loop through
the AND gate and chained inverters/buffers. Therefore, the
oscillation frequency is mainly determined by the number of
inverters/buffers and their propagation delays. To internally
measure a RO frequency, its output is used to trigger a binary
counter circuit. This counter value is sampled at a user-defined
rate, such that changes in the counter value between successive
samples of the same RO reflect changes in operating conditions.
Delay-Line Based Sensor. Another prominent on-chip
sensor is a delay line, i.e., a chain of buffers, through which a
clock signal propagates. Propagation delay is measured by how
far the clock propagates through the enabled/open buffers within
a fixed time frame using a time-to-digital convertor (TDC)
circuit. This numeric value at the TDC output is sampled at
some user-defined rate, such that changes in TDC value between
successive samples reflect changes in operating conditions.
Zhao and Suh [13] examined the trade-off between RO
and delay-line based sensors in terms of sampling frequency,
accuracy, resolution and complexity.
B. Reconfigurable Power Viruses
Examples of on-chip power dissipating circuits are: RO-
based, FF-based and PIP-based power viruses. By toggling
a large group of such power viruses for enough time, voltage
drops (both transient and steady-state drops) can be induced
in the PDN. FF-based power virus consists of a D flip-flop
(D-FF), whose output is connected to the input of an inverter,
2Combinatorial circuits consist only of wires and logic gates.
3DRC is deployed by Amazon AWS to prevent clients’ designs containing
combinatorial ROs https://github.com/aws/aws-fpga/blob/master/ERRATA.md.
while the inverter output is fed back to the input of the D-
FF [60]. Whereas, PIP-based power virus is constructed by
leveraging programmable interconnect points (PIPs) in Xilinx
FPGAs. These are programmable transistors used to connect
inputs and outputs of I/O blocks and CLBs into routing network
in the FPGA fabric. Unused PIPs and wires in the FPGA fabric
resemble a high capacitance such that frequently charging and
discharging it result in transient voltage drop and overshoot in
the PDN [62].
On-chip power dissipating circuits can be precisely controlled
to induce power glitches within a specific time-frame. Moreover,
such power viruses can be activated for long enough time to
heat the FPGA. Such circuits can be leveraged to mount power
fault attacks, as well as on-chip noise generators for mitigating
side-channel attacks, as we describe later in more detail.
C. Fault-Injection Attacks
DoS Attacks. Gnad et al. [11] deploy thousands of RO-
based power viruses to construct a power-hungry circuit. The
excessive switching activities of the ROs, in the picosecond
regime, create voltage emergencies in the PDN that cannot
be compensated by the decoupling capacitors or the voltage
regulator. This causes a Xilinx Virtex 6 FPGA to crash in less
than 1 ms. Such a DoS attack is deemed feasible on FPGAs
deployed in Amazon EC2 F1 instances [63]. Another way to
induce such DoS attack is by invoking short circuits [64].
Fault Attacks. Mahmoud et al. [12] also leverage a power-
hungry circuit to induce timing failures during the operation
of a true random number generator, used for the generation of
secret keys, on a Xilinx Virtex 7. The faulty output was shown
to be biased and failed randomness tests. Krautter et al. [20]
show that by precisely controlling a power-hungry circuit it is
feasible to induce timing failures in the 9th round of a soft AES-
128 core, i.e., implemented in the FPGA fabric. The induced
timing faults are used to recover the AES key on an Intel
Cyclone V SoC by means of a differential fault analysis [65],
where the victim AES core operated at 111 MHz and spatially
shared the FPGA with an array of RO-based power viruses.
The achieved key recovery rate is of 93% on average using
an average of 18K encrypted messages. The aforementioned
attacks require implanting malicious logic on the same FPGA
where the cryptographic cores are running. Weissman et al. [66]
demonstrate stealthier fault injection attacks, by leveraging the
Rowhammer effect 4, that can be mounted from the FPGA on
the host’s memory subsystem without the need for malicious
logic.
D. Side-Channel Attacks
Remote side-channel attacks on cloud FPGAs can be
classified in two major categories: attacks based on either the
power leakage or the crosstalk effect of the victim circuit. The
crosstalk effect is caused by the electromagnetic interference
that occurs between unshielded long wires that are laid in
parallel (see Fig. 1b). Thus, a signal transmitted through
4Inducing bit flips in DRAM cells by repeatedly accessing their neighboring
rows [67].
one long wire influences the propagation delay of signals
in neighboring long wires (with a maximum distance of two
wires).
Power Leakage. Schellenberg et al. [14] deploy a delay-line
sensor to detect voltage fluctuations in the PDN caused by
the activity of a soft AES-128 core. Using correlation power
analysis (CPA), encrypted messages and the measured sensor
values, i.e., power traces, the secret key can be fully recovered.
The attack is shown to be successful for different locations of
the sensor with reference to that of the AES core, with fewer
traces required when the sensor is closer to the AES core.
In [13], RO-based voltage sensors are leveraged to monitor
the activity of a co-located RSA-1024 core on the same FPGA
fabric. Using simple power analysis (SPA) and sampled power
traces of 20 RO-based voltage sensors, RSA private key can
recovered using an average of 9 encrypted messages, when
both victim and attacker circuits are isolated by passive fences
of unused logic [68]. The attack also works when the RSA
encryption runs as a process on a CPU that shares the same
PDN with the FPGA, i.e., in FPGA-based SoC. The RSA key
can also be recovered with more traces/encrypted messages,
when another power-consuming circuit is running, whose power
consumption is comparable to that of the RSA core.
Such attacks have been also shown possible even when
the sensor and the victim logic run on two different FPGA
chips integrated on the same board that share the power supply
in [15]. Table I summarizes the details of the attacks and the
number of required encryption/decryption operations.
Crosstalk Effect. Ramesh et al. [16] exploit the crosstalk
effect between long wires in FPGAs to successfully obtain
the secret key of a soft AES-128 core. The transmitter, routed
through long wires, is an input to an AES S-box. The snooping
circuit comprises a RO-based voltage sensor (as in Fig. 4b)
triggering a counter. The receiver, which is one of the RO’s
wires, is routed through long wires and is located next to the
transmitter wire. Using differential power analysis (DPA) [69],
the counter values obtained from the snooping circuit (power
traces) and the encrypted messages, the key of the final round
of the AES-128 can be recovered byte by byte. Then the
encryption key can be obtained by inverting the key schedule.
The crosstalk effect increases for longer transmission pair and
lower operating frequencies of the victim logic, which directly
influences the number of encryption operations required to
recover the key. The attack is evaluated on several boards:
Altera DE2-115, Cyclone IV, Stratix V and DE5a-Net Arria
10 GX boards [16], [70].
The same effect is also demonstrated (albeit in another
context) in [17], where the authors leverage a sliding-window
sampling scheme to sample the RO-based sensor at overlapping
time periods in order to extract the value of each transmitted bit
of a secret key. The authors compute the probability of correctly
recovering the key. Their formula indicates that the probability
is higher for larger keys (asymmetric vs. symmetric keys) and
smaller window sizes, which is demonstrated for 32-bit keys
in [71]. In Table II we summarize the performance of each of
the aforementioned DPA and sliding window approaches.
Long wire leakage is characterized for different generations
and families of Xilinx FPGA devices including Virtex 5, Virtex
6, Artix 7, Spartan 7 and Virtex UltraScale+ [71], [72]. In
particular, long wire leakage in Xilinx UltraScale+ FPGAs,
which are deployed in real-world cloud infrastructures, e.g.,
Amazon F1 and Huawei FP1 instances, can still be measured,
even though on Amazon F1 instances ROs with combinatorial
loops are prevented in user logic. This is made possible by
deploying latch-based RO or flip-flop based RO sensors, shown
in Fig. 4c and Fig. 4d, which bypass detection checks on
commercial clouds [61]. More technical details on the crosstalk
effect and the attacks can be found in Appendix § -B.
To summarize, exploiting the crosstalk effect requires more
power traces and/or encryption operations than a power side-
channel attack, as seen in Table I and Table II. Furthermore,
the crosstalk effect diminishes for victim circuits operating at
higher frequencies [16]. Besides, it requires close proximity
between the victim and snooping circuit with a maximum of
one long wire separating the transmitter and the receiver. Thus,
it is, in practice, harder to achieve in real-world settings.
E. Covert-Channel Attacks
Known covert channels on cloud FPGAs can be established
based on one of three effects, namely crosstalk effect, power
leakage and thermal leakage. The first two effects require that
both the transmitter and receiver are co-located on the same
cloud FPGA at the same time (spatial multi-tenancy) which
is not yet adopted by industry. However, thermal leakage can
be exploited in real-world cloud FPGAs deployment model,
where each client rents a whole FPGA at his/her disposal
(temporal multi-tenancy). However, establishing the thermal
covert channels between cloud FPGA users requires a pre-
agreement on the targeted specific FPGA, which implies
disclosing information about the cloud infrastructure, i.e.,
identifying FPGA instances allocated to tenants. One approach
to acquire such information is by fingerprinting cloud FPGAs
using physically unclonable functions to measure unique
characteristics of the FPGAs. Tian et al. [73] conduct the
experiments on Amazon AWS cloud and demonstrate the
feasibility of renting the same FPGA by two successive clients
for the different AWS instances.
Crosstalk Effect. Besides side-channel attacks, the crosstalk
effect can be exploited to construct a covert channel between
two circuits sharing the FPGA resources at the same time.
The authors in [17], [71] propose to use a transmission pair of
2-segment long wire and a transmission period of 82 µs per bit.
Thus, using the Manchester encoding scheme, in which one
bit of information is represented as a tuple: ‘1’ as (1,0) and ‘0’
as (0,1), the constructed channel has a bandwidth of 6.1kbps
and accuracy of 90 - 99.9% without using error-correcting
codes. The covert channels have been shown on several Xilinx
devices.
Power Leakage. By leveraging a grid of RO-based power
viruses as transmitters and RO-based voltage sensors as
receivers, the authors demonstrate in [18] a covert channel
between two users spatially sharing a cloud FPGA. Although
TABLE I
REMOTE SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS LEVERAGING POWER LEAKAGE.
Ref.
Victim Circuit Sensor Circuit Required
Analysis Proximity between Sensor & VictimKey Size Frequency Type SamplingFrequency
Encrypted
Messages
[14] AES (128-bit) 24 MHz Delay-line 24
a MHz 5K CPA Single Xilinx Spartan 6 chip ((SAKURA-G board))
[15] 24 MHz 2.5 million CPA Two Xilinx Spartan 6 chips (SAKURA-G board)
[13] RSA (1024-bit) 20 MHz RO 0.1 MHz 8.9 b SPA Single Xilinx Artix 7 (Zynq-7020 SoC, Zedboard)
[15] RSA (224-bit) 24 MHz Delay-line 24 MHz not reported SPA Two Xilinx Spartan 6 chips (SAKURA-G board)
a Results apply also to other sampling frequencies: 48, 72 & 96 MHz.
b Traces are reported for the case when the RSA and sensor logic are isolated by a passive fence of unused logic [68].
TABLE II
REMOTE SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS LEVERAGING CROSSTALK EFFECT.
Ref.
Victim Circuit Snooping Circuit
Analysis PlatformKey Size Frequency Transmitter Sampling RequiredLength Frequency Encrypted Messages
[16] AES a (128-bit) 1 MHz 1-segmentlong wire 1 MHz 233K DPA
Intel Cyclone IV GX
(Development Kit)
[71] 32-bit 0.78 MHz ≥ 1-segmentlong wire 195 KHz 20K
b Sliding Window
(w= 4)
Xilinx Artix 7
(Nexys 4 DDR)
a Reported results are for automatically placed and routed victim AES.
b For all four counters, i.e., 5K per counter, to recover only 98.4% of the 32-bit key.
multi-tenant spatially-shared FPGAs are not yet deployed in
real-world cloud solutions, such covert channels are shown
on Amazon F1 and Huawei FP1 instances, which deploy
Xilinx 3D Viretx UltraScale+ FPGAs. Virtex UltraScale+ FPGA
chips accommodate up to four dies called super logic regions
(SLRs) in a single chip to deliver high logic density [74],
where these dies share power and clock delivery systems. The
authors envisioned, in a multi-tenant scenario, that each SLR
would be dedicated to a different tenant and demonstrated the
construction of a covert channel between two SLRs. The covert
channel constructed had a bandwidth of 781Kbps (488Kbps
for FPGAs operating at a lower frequency) and an accuracy
of 97 - 99.9% on Huawei FP1 (Amazon F1) boards, assuming
all transmitters are enabled and disabled simultaneously and
a standard Manchester encoding is deployed. Power leakage
based covert-channel is further improved and demonstrated on
three realistic setups of FPGA-to-FPGA, CPU-to-FPGA and
GPU-to-FPGA, where transmitters and receivers are separated
on two distinct boards sharing only the external power supply
unit in [75].
Thermal Leakage. By leveraging a grid of ROs as transmit-
ters (heaters) and RO-based thermal sensors as receivers, the
authors in [19] demonstrate building a covert channel between
two users temporally sharing a cloud FPGA. A transmitter
circuit is configured on the FPGA and enabled to achieve
a steady-state temperature corresponding to logic ‘1’. Then
the transmitter circuit is disabled and the FPGA is left idle
for a while before configuring the receiver’s bitstream on
the same FPGA. The receiver circuit then measures the ROs
frequencies and compares them to nominal ROs frequencies
which correspond to logical ‘0’ to acquire the transmitted
value. The covert channel bandwidth is defined by the heating
period, the maximum time gap between heating the FPGA and
sensing its temperature, and the transmitter’s size (number of
ROs). The evaluation is performed on cloud FPGA instances
(Intel Stratix V FPGAs), where for an idle period between
two users of a cloud FPGA of 120 seconds, 6.64 minutes
are required to leak one bit. Unlike covert channels based
on crosstalk or power leakage, thermal leakage impose no
constraints on the placements of transmitter and receiver circuits
since the generated heat can be sensed from anywhere on the
FPGA. Table III shows the different covert channels that can
be established in FPGAs and their bandwidths.
VII. MITIGATING ATTACKS
We outline next defenses that have been recently proposed to
mitigate the attacks described in § VI, which can be classified
into either detection or prevention.
A. Detection of Attacks
We refer here to runtime detection solutions that aim to
identify malicious logic (during its execution) and can thus
mainly defend against active attackers.
Detection of Fault-Injection Attacks. Provelengios et
al. [76] propose to deploy a network of RO-based sensors
in the shell of a multi-tenant FPGA to detect voltage drops and
locate the center of a power wasting logic. This information
can be used by CSP to revoke the malicious logic from the
FPGA. However, it is likely that, until the malicious logic is
located and revoked, timing errors in neighboring logic would
still occur, besides generating false positives.
TABLE III
REMOTE COVERT-CHANNEL ATTACKS.
Ref. Deployed Effect Coding Scheme Bandwidth Error Rate Multi-Tenancy Platform
[71] Crosstalk Manchestera 6.1 Kbps 0.1 - 1% Spatial
Transmitter & Receiver both on
Xilinx Virtex 5 (ML509),
Virtex 6(ML605), Artix 7 (ArtyS7),
Spartan 7 (Nexys 4 DDR & Basys 3)
[18] Power Leakage Manchester 488 Kbps 0.1% Spatial
Transmitter & Receiver on
different SLRs of Xilinx Virtex
UltraScale+ (Amazon F1)
[18] Power Leakage Manchester 781 Kbps 0.1% Spatial
Transmitter & Receiver on
different SLRs of Xilinx Virtex
UltraScale+ (Huawei FP1)
[75] Power Leakage Manchester 6.1 bps ≤ 10% Temporal Transmitter: Xilinx Kintex 7 (KC705)Receiver: Xilinx Artix 7 (AC701)
[75] Power Leakage Manchester 6.1 bps 3% - Transmitter: CPU (14 threads)Receiver: Xilinx Artix 7 (AC701)
[75] Power Leakage Manchester 2 bps 3% - Transmitter: GPUReceiver: Xilinx Artix 7 (AC701)
[19] Thermal Leakage none 1 bit per 6.64 minute 0% Temporal Intel Stratix V (TACC)
a Assuming no changes in operating conditions, e.g., monotonic changes in temperature.
B. Prevention of Attacks
Prevention of Malicious Primitives. Such techniques at-
tempt to verify that a user design logic is harmless. Two
approaches have been proposed: either applying design rule
checks to verify that a netlist does not violate a set of pre-
defined rules, or checking the final bitstream by “antivirus”
programs. Amazon AWS enforces design rule checks on
the clients’ uploaded designs to prevent combinatorial loops,
e.g. ROs, before generating the final bitstreams 5. However,
alternative designs (e.g., sequential RO circuits) can still bypass
these checks [61], [62], [72]. In [77], [78] virus scanners
are proposed for deployment by the CSP to detect malicious
primitives ( § VI-A and § VI-B). However, reverse-engineering
of the bitstream is required to search for uncommon structural
and behavioral properties of malicious logic in the recovered
netlist. Nevertheless, this requires regularly updating the virus
scanner framework with formulation of properties, i.e., virus
signatures, to account for new malicious logic designs. Most
importantly, this approach violates IP protection, although not
adopted by industrial cloud services yet, since access to plain
text bitstreams is inevitable.
Prevention of Crosstalk-Effect Attacks. Giechaskiel et
al. [17], [71] propose to add guarding wires, which are the
neighboring four long wires, two from each side, of a long
victim wire. The guarding wires can be left unoccupied or
further driven by random values. This can be performed either
by manual inspection of the placed and routed design to identify
the source of leakage and add the guarding wires or by the
support of FPGA vendor toolchains. This requires including
directives in the HDL design by the developer to annotate
sensitive signals and further modifying routing algorithms to
automate adding the guarding wires.
Mitigation of Power-Leakage Attacks. Krautter et al. [79]
propose to reduce side-channel leakage by implanting a fence
5https://github.com/aws/aws-fpga/blob/master/ERRATA.md
of ROs, which works as a noise generator circuit, around the
logic to be protected, thus reducing signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR).
The authors also show that a fence activation strategy based on
internal power measurements, using feedback measurements
from voltage sensors, is more effective than a random activation
pattern. This is in line with the findings in [13], where the
authors demonstrate the limitation of their attack with co-
existing noise. However, this approach is both technology- and
application-dependent, and requires experimental evaluation on
the targeted FPGA board to determine the total amount of fence
ROs required to neutralize the voltage fluctuations induced by
the cryptographic primitives. Other known countermeasures
against power leakage or power analysis attacks are hiding and
masking. Masking techniques for reconfigurable platforms are
either inefficient with respect to area and performance [80],
or still generate exploitable leakage [81]. Moreover, masking
techniques should be designed for every cryptographic func-
tion individually and the desired security guarantees. Hiding
techniques on FPGAs suffer well-known issues that cause
information leakage. These are imbalanced routing [82], early
propagation effect [83] and glitches [84].
Prevention of Thermal-Leakage Attacks. A CSP can
enforce a minimum idle period, on the order of minutes,
after a client releases the FPGA allowing it to recover to a
nominal temperature before allocating it to another client [19].
Alternatively, the FPGA can be heated or cooled to a pre-
defined temperature before the next client can use the FPGA.
VIII. DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Future of FPGA Cloud Computing
FPGA devices have only become increasingly deployed by
cloud service providers very recently, but spatial multi-tenant
FPGA computing is currently not yet supported. However, it is
more recently being investigated and considered for deployment.
In light of our survey of the state of the art on that front, as well
as our analysis of the additional security and privacy concerns
that would arise for this cloud FPGA computing deployment,
we present next some of our insights and recommendations
for the future of FPGA-based cloud computing.
Cross-Stakeholder Efforts. Different stakeholders (outlined
in § IV) are involved in FPGA cloud computing, each having
different concerns, requirements, rights and responsibilities
from a security/privacy standpoint. Many of these influence
each other and also influence the entire supply chain and
deployment process, even prompting low-end requirements on
the FPGA fabrication itself (with cloud computing deployment
in mind). It is thus imperative for relevant stakeholders to
continue to actively and systematically analyze and address
these concerns and requirements together early on in a coherent
and proactive approach. Through an open and systematic
collaboration, FPGA vendors become aware of the requirements
of FPGA devices specifically for cloud deployment, since this
influences the logic and architectural constructs that would be
hard-wired in the device fabric at production. Various security
solutions proposed by academics in recent years targeting FPGA
cloud computing would be significantly more efficient or even
only feasible if certain primitives are already incorporated
into the FPGA fabric at production. Furthermore, for key
provisioning and IP protection, FPGA vendor support and
involvement is further required after the FPGA device is
acquired by the CSP. Thus, the requirements on FPGA devices
used by single users are not the same for devices deployed in
the cloud, which some FPGA vendors are already recognizing
and addressing with their more recent FPGA devices.
Similarly, toolchains are required to cater for cloud deploy-
ment requirements to provide additional security guarantees,
e.g., by extending them with particular design rule checks
to enforce certain constraints on routing (e.g., to eliminate
potential crosstalk across co-located tenants) and checking for
potentially malicious design primitives. The deployment of
these toolchains and SDKs, i.e., whether they are at the client’s
end or hosted by the CSP, and whether they can be trusted,
and how justified are these trust assumptions, and consequently
what are the security guarantees they can provide, are more
open questions that can only be answered through a thorough
and open exchange across all stakeholders. One way this can
achieved more systematically and openly is through a more
formal collaboration, such as the Confidential Computing Con-
sortium [85] recently established to standardize the adoption
of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) technologies among
industry players. This already includes various CSPs and an
FPGA vendor as members, and may be a good starting point
to initiate dedicated focus and analysis of FPGAs in cloud
computing and establishing relevant standards.
Key Provisioning and Management. Among the various
outstanding issues with cloud FPGA computing, IP protection
for different FPGA tenants, as well as the required key
provisioning and management to guarantee that, are the most
prominent and evolving concerns in FPGA-based computing.
Being a topic of concern in earlier years for end-users, FPGA
vendors have reacted already, as evident in more recent FPGA
boards that provide both bitstream encryption and integrity
protection as we have presented in § V-A. A user can program
his/her secret key into the FPGA in a secure environment
and then deploy it in field ready for future secure updates.
However, in the cloud scenario, a client has no physical
access to the FPGA and thus no secure means to program
a secret key remotely into the FPGA. Moreover, multiple
clients might be allocated to use the same FPGA instance
within a relatively short time-frame. Therefore, a remote secret
key provisioning and management scheme, tailored for these
deployment and usage settings, is required. In this direction
several proposals have been introduced. They either rely on
public key cryptography [22], [35] or physically unclonable
functions, i.e., PUF-based secret key generation [27]. Both of
which require the support of FPGA vendors, both architecturally
and in the key management scheme that follows after the FPGA
is acquired by the CSP. FPGA vendors, such as Intel and
Microsemi, have already began addressing these challenges
in their most recent FPGAs, e.g., Intel Stratix 10 [46], [47]
and Microsemi SmartFusion 2 [50], but key management to
multiple cloud clients still remains unaddressed.
Lessons Learned. We can draw various lessons from CPU-
based cloud computing that would analogously translate to
FPGA-based cloud computing. One most critical open question
is the means to establish a trust anchor on an FPGA in the
cloud, analogous to CPU-based TEEs [43], [44]. A supporting
infrastructure (architecturally in FPGA devices as well as within
overlying protocols and toolchains provided, besides support
from relevant stakeholders) is required to provide the client
with means to exchange a secret session key with the FPGA
trust anchor, securely communicate and provision his/her IP on
the FPGA, and to have sufficient guarantees that this IP (and
all processed data) remains contained in secure and untampered
isolation. Moreover, establishing trust in cloud FPGAs would
consequently enable the integrity and confidentiality of data
processed by the FPGA and stored in external DRAM memory
(assuming physical access adversaries), which is yet another
security challenge for trusted computing. On cloud FPGAs,
this can only be enabled once secure exchange of clients’
secret keys for data encryption and authentication is supported,
thus mitigating potential sniffing, spoofing, splicing and replay
attacks on external DRAM by CSPs.
This, further, calls for a comprehensive analysis of the min-
imal trusted computing base (both in hardware and software)
required to establish the trust anchor and provide the required
security/privacy guarantees. This includes investigating efficient
secure key and certificate provisioning, storage, and readout, as
well as the minimal hardware primitives required to establish
an FPGA-based root of trust (cryptographic primitives, their
formally verified implementations, side-channel resilience, etc.).
Furthermore, which of these primitives need to be “baked
in” or hard-wired into the FPGA fabric and which can be
provided as configurable logic? How much hardware-software
co-design is needed and what are the ideal design choices
therein? How can debug interfaces, such as JTAG among others,
be provided securely to still enable cloud clients to debug
their FPGA development without threatening the confidentiality
of the IP and computations running on the FPGAs? Various
usability/performance/security trade-offs are involved within
these open questions, all of which require a comprehensive and
systematic treatment, and practical solutions by FPGA vendors,
that would be adopted by commercial CSPs.
Only in recent years, did researchers and practitioners
uncover security flaws in microachitectural optimizations, e.g.,
caches and speculative execution, that have driven our modern
processors for decades. More of these flaws originate in the
hardware and can only be fundamentally patched by changing
the hardware. More critically, some of these flaws undermine
the security guarantees of TEEs established in these processors.
Many valuable lessons can be drawn from this for cloud-
based FPGA computing; a rigorous and systematic security
analysis of the underlying fabric and trust anchor is crucial for
the derived security guarantees of all that lies on top of that.
Furthermore, for FPGAs, unlike CPUs, the raw hardware fabric
itself is exposed to users to reconfigure and customize with
complete freedom, which poses intuitively an even larger attack
surface. In multi-tenant FPGA computing, when the hardware
fabric is fundamentally shared by multiple tenants operating
on the same device, the same power delivery networks are
also shared. Thus, complete isolation at the physical level is
fundamentally not possible, and there will always be means to
induce malicious physical effects, so long as tenants are free to
arbitrarily program their user logic. As shown in § VII, there
is no foolproof way to vet and police the provided bitstreams
for such malicious circuits or their signatures.
Also analogously to TEE infrastructures and SDKs in CPU-
based computing, trust in FPGA SDKs is to be carefully
examined and trust assumptions are to be questioned and
justified, even when these SDKs are provided by FPGA vendors
and CSPs. The critical security implications of a memory
corruption vulnerability, as found in the SGX SDK, have
been demonstrated in [86], where the authors show how this
vulnerability is exploited to craft a return-oriented-programming
attack chain in the Trusted Runtime System (tRTS) code
handling enclave entry. Similarly, FPGA vendor and CSP SDKs
for cloud development need to be scrutinized and tested for
such vulnerabilities and hardened accordingly.
B. Call to Action
Given the aforementioned open challenges and research
questions in deploying end-to-end secure multi-tenant FPGA
cloud computing, we conclude with a call for future research
and investigation by both academia and all relevant stakeholders
collaboratively in industry. While academics have shown
and reported a spectrum of remotely-exploitable FPGA-based
physical attacks, which demonstrate the threats of FPGA
multi-tenancy, these actually only touch one dimension of the
problem. This still leaves other, perhaps even more fundamental,
dimensions uncharted and unaddressed in the end-to-end
deployment process, which call for immediate attention and
action if FPGA-based cloud computing would be much more
ubiquitously adopted by enterprises.
Open Standards, Documentation and Disclaimers. Re-
sulting from an open collaborative exchange between all
stakeholders involved (ideally through a formal consortium),
open standards and certifications of how TEEs can be adopted
for FPGA-based computing can be established and enforced
for all relevant entities. This would provide mutual guidelines
for CSPs and FPGA vendors on their provided devices and
services, and would equally reassure clients with certain and
clear security and privacy guarantees. Along the same lines,
CSPs and FPGA vendors would be able to document more
openly and publicly their security settings and assumptions.
This would provide better client education, awareness and
disclaimers on how much security guarantees are, indeed,
provided in terms of IP and data protection, and what are
the configuration choices available, perhaps, for a client.
Spatial Multi-Tenant FPGA Computing. Remote physical
attacks, surveyed in § VI, preemptively demonstrate and empha-
size why spatial multi-tenant FPGA computing is discouraged,
or at best adopted cautiously with additional vetting applied to
the provided bitstreams by the co-tenants. On the other hand,
while solutions for detection of malicious circuit constructions
and suspicious behavior are reported in literature, they remain
specific fixes to specific attacks. They provide no guarantees
for future zero-day attacks and some cannot be applied by
reconfiguring logic and require logic baked in by the FPGA
vendor. This would then require the CSP to exchange its own
FPGA devices with new ones “patched” in silicon. Nevertheless,
in quest for profitability and as FPGA devices’ capacities keep
scaling, CSPs may eventually adopt spatial multi-tenancy. If so,
tenants must be informed if they are sharing an FPGA instance
(along with security disclaimers on what are the likely threats)
and should be allowed to select (and thus pay) to acquire a
dedicated FPGA instance, if desired.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we survey industrial and academic deployment
models of FPGAs in the cloud computing settings, and highlight
their different adversary models and security guarantees, while
shedding light on their fundamental shortcomings from a
security standpoint. We further survey and classify existing
academic works on recent remotely-exploitable physical attacks
on multi-tenant FPGA devices, where these attacks are launched
remotely by malicious clients sharing physical resources with
victim clients. Through investigating the problem of end-to-
end multi-tenant FPGA deployment more comprehensively, we
shed the light on other open security and privacy challenges,
e.g., IP protection. We conclude with our insights and a call
for future research to tackle these challenges.
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A. Ring Oscillator: Different Structures
A classical ring oscillator (RO) is shown in Fig. 4a. It is also
possible to keep only one inverter and replace the rest with
digital buffers as shown in Fig. 4b. Both RO designs Fig. 4a
and Fig. 4b are pure combinatorial logic circuits, whereas
the latch-based RO and the flip-flop (FF) based RO, shown
in Fig. 4c and Fig. 4d respectively, are sequential.
B. Details on Attacks Exploiting the Crosstalk Effect
Attack [16]. In the attack by Ramesh et al. [16], the key of
the final round of the AES-128 is recovered byte by byte. This
requires the attacker and victim circuits on the same FPGA to
have 16 transmitter-receiver pairs of neighboring long wires,
with one pair for each byte of the final round key, in case of a
high-throughput AES implementation with a datapath of 128-
bit. Consequently, this is reduced to one pair of neighboring
long wires if the AES has an 8-bit datapath.
The crosstalk effect increases for longer transmission lines
and lower operating frequencies of the victim logic, which
directly influences the number of encryptions required to
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Fig. 4. Different RO Designs.
recover the key. For example, a minimum of 217 encryptions
are required to recover the key for an AES core running at
10KHz, whereas at a higher operating frequency of 4MHz a 1.5
million encryptions are required. Interestingly, this crosstalk
effect can also be leveraged to build an adjacency map for
long wires within each channel in the FPGA [70], which is
considered a proprietary information.
Attacks [17] and [71]. The same crosstalk effect is also
demonstrated (albeit in another context) in [17], i.e., when
integrating encrypted or obfuscated third-party FPGA designs
from multiple IP vendors in single design. In [17] the authors
observe that, the propagation delay of the receiver’s long wire is
highly influenced by how long a neighboring victim long wire
carries a signal ‘1’ within a sampling period. Thus, the counter
value, i.e., the frequency of the RO connected to the receiver,
indicates the hamming weight of the transmitted bits over
the victim long wire within that sampling period. Therefore,
the authors propose a sliding-window scheme to sample the
counter at overlapping periods to extract the value of each
transmitted bit of a secret key. By subtracting two overlapped
hamming weights, information on the first and last bits of the
corresponding windows are revealed. Assuming that the victim
long wire is transmitting the whole key bits sequentially, and
using a sliding-window of size w bits and a secret key of size
N bits, where N is a multiple of w, i.e., N = nw, the authors
compute the probability of recovering the key:
P=
(
1− 1
2n−1
)w
(1)
This implies that the probability of key recovering is higher
for larger keys (asymmetric vs. symmetric keys) and smaller
window sizes. Equation 1, however, does not take into account
noisy hamming weight measurements due to operating condi-
tions (transmission frequency) and layout of transmission pair
(length of transmission lines and distance between them). The
sliding-window approach is applied to 32-bit keys in [71]. The
authors demonstrate that using a sliding window of size w= 4
bits, 98.4% of the 32-bit key can be recovered assuming a
single bit stays constant on the transmitter for 1.28 µs, i.e.,
780 KHz signal frequency, and a transmission pair of at least
1-segment long wire. Moreover, it requires connecting four
counters (equal to the window size) to the snooping circuit,
where these counters are sampled at overlapping periods of
5.12 µs (4 × 1.28 µs).
